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The soldiers of the United States Army are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers. Unfortunately, the enemies we
are likely to face through the rest of this decade and beyond will not be "soldiers," with the disciplined modernity that
term conveys in Euro-America, but "warriors"--erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no
stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders
they do not like. Warriors have always been around, but with the rise of professional soldieries their importance was
eclipsed. Now, thanks to a unique confluence of breaking empire, overcultivated Western consciences, and a
worldwide cultural crisis,[1] the warrior is back, as brutal as ever and distinctly better-armed.
The primary function of any civilization is to restrain human excess, and even Slavic socialism served a civilizing
mission in this regard. But as the restraints of contemporary civilization recede and noncompetitive cultures fracture,
victim-states often do not have the forces, and the self-emasculated West does not possess the will, to control the new
warrior class arising in so many disparate parts of the world. We have entered an age in which entire nations are
subject to dispossession, starvation, rape, and murder on a scale approaching genocide--not at the hands of a
conquering foreign power but under the guns of their neighbors. Paramilitary warriors--thugs whose talent for violence
blossoms in civil war--defy legitimate governments and increasingly end up leading governments they have
overturned. This is a new age of warlords, from Somalia to Myanmar/Burma, from Afghanistan to Yugoslavia. In
Georgia an ex-convict has become a kingmaker, and in Azerbaijan a warlord who marched on the capitol with a
handful of wheezing armored vehicles became prime minister. In Chechnya, on the northern slopes of the Caucasus, a
renegade general carved out the world's first state run entirely by gangsters--not the figurative gangsters of high
Stalinism, but genuine black marketeers, murderers, drug dealers, and pimps.[2] Their warriors are the source of power
for these chieftains, and the will of the populace, enervated and fickle, matters little when it matters at all.
This article will briefly consider who these new warriors are in terms of their social and psychological origins, and will
examine the environment in which they operate. The objective is to provide an intellectual passport into the warrior's
sullen world for US military officers and defense analysts, who, given their cultural and professional conditioning,
would much rather deal with more conventional threats. This is an alert message from a very dark place.

Most warriors emerge from four social pools which exist in some form in all significant cultures. These pools
produce warriors who differ in their individual implacability and redeemability. This differentiation is key to
understanding warriors--who outwardly may appear identical to one another--and helps identify human centers of
gravity within warrior bands or movements.
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Figure 1. Where the soldier and the warrior diverge--the traits that define them.

First-pool warriors come, as they always have, from the underclass (although their leaders often have fallen from the
upper registers of society). The archetype of the new warrior class is a male who has no stake in peace, a loser with
little education, no legal earning power, no abiding attractiveness to women,[3] and no future. With gun in hand and
the spittle of nationalist ideology dripping from his mouth, today's warrior murders those who once slighted him,
seizes the women who avoided him, and plunders that which he would never otherwise have possessed. Initially, the
totemic effect of a uniform, however shabby and incomplete,[4] and the half-understood rhetoric of a cause lend him a
notion of personal dignity he never sensed before, but his dedication to the cause is rarely as enduring as his taste for
spoils. He will, however, cling to his empowering military garb. For the new warrior class, many of whose members
possess no skills marketable in peace, the end of fighting means the end of the good times.
The longer the fighting continues, the more irredeemable this warrior becomes. And as society's preparatory structures
such as schools, formal worship systems, communities, and families are disrupted, young males who might otherwise
have led productive lives are drawn into the warrior milieu. These form a second pool. For these boys and young men,
deprived of education and orientation, the company of warriors provides a powerful behavioral framework. Although
some second-pool warriors can ultimately be gathered back into society, the average warrior who takes up a
Kalashnikov at age 13 is probably not going to settle down to finish out his secondary school education ten years later
without a powerful incentive.
The third pool of warriordom consists of the patriots. These may be men who fight out of strong belief, either in
ethnic, religious, or national superiority or endangerment, or those who have suffered a personal loss in the course of a
conflict that motivates them to take up arms. Although these warriors are the easiest to reintegrate into civil structures-especially if their experience of violence is relatively brief--some of these men, too, will develop a taste for blood and
war's profits. These warriors are the most individualized psychologically, and their redeemability will depend on
character, cultural context, and the depth of any personal loss, as well as on standard characteristics such as goal
achievement in their conflict and perceived postwar opportunities for jobs and other societal rewards.
Dispossessed, cashiered, or otherwise failed military men form the fourth and most dangerous pool of warriors.
Officers, NCOs, or just charismatic privates who could not function in a traditional military environment, these men
bring other warriors the rudiments of the military art--just enough to inspire faith and encourage folly in many cases,
although the fittest of these men become the warrior chieftains or warlords with whom we must finally cope. The
greatest, although not the only, contemporary source of military men who have degenerated into warriors is the former
Soviet Union. Whether veterans of Afghanistan or simply officers who lost their positions in post-collapse cutbacks,
Russian and other former-Soviet military men currently serve as mercenaries or volunteers (often one and the same
thing) in the moral wasteland of Yugoslavia and on multiple sides in conflicts throughout the former Soviet Union.
These warriors are especially dangerous not only because their skills heighten the level of bloodshed, but also because
they provide a nucleus of internationally available mercenaries for future conflicts. Given that most civil wars begin
with the actions of a small fraction of the population (as little as one percent might actively participate in or support
the initial violence),[5] any rabid assembly of militants with cash will be able to recruit mercenary forces with ease
and spark "tribal" strife that will make the brutality of Africa in the 1960s seem like some sort of Quaker peaceable
kingdom.
Paradoxically, while the warrior seeks to hold society out of equilibrium for his own profit, he thus prevents society
from offering him any alternative to the warrior life. In our century of massive postwar demobilizations, most
receiving governments retained sufficient structure to absorb and assist their ex-soldiers. Helpfully, the soldiers of the
great armies of the West rarely tasted war's spoils as does the warrior; rather, soldiers experienced war's sacrificial

side. But the broken states in which warriors currently control the balance of power do not have the infrastructure to
receive veterans and help them rebuild their lives. In many cases, the warrior's roots have been torn up and, since he is
talented only at violence, his loyalty has focused on his warlord, his band of fellow warriors, or, simply, on himself.[6]
Even should the miracle of peace descend on the ruins of Yugoslavia, the survivor states will be unable to
constructively absorb all of the warriors who have fallen away from civilized norms--and the warriors themselves
often will have no real interest in being absorbed. In the Caucasus and Afghanistan, in Nicaragua and Haiti, warriors
without wars will create problems for a generation.
In the centuries before the rise of modern professional armies, the European world often faced the problem of the
warrior deprived of war. In the 16th century--another age of shattered belief systems--disbanded imperial armies
spread syphilis and banditry across the continent, and the next century's Thirty Years War--waged largely by warriors
and not by soldiers as we know them--saw the constant disbanding and reformation of armies, with the Soldateska
growing ever more vicious, unruly, and merciless.[7] Arguably modern Europe's greatest trauma, the Thirty Years War
formally ended in 1648, but its warriors continued to disrupt the continent until they found other wars in which to die,
were hacked to death by vengeful peasants, or were hunted down like beasts by authorities who finally had caught
their breath. Today's warriors have a tremendous advantage over their antique brethren in the struggle for survival,
however: the West's pathetic, if endearing, concern for human life, even when that life belongs to a murderer of epic
achievement.

For the US soldier, vaccinated with moral and behavioral codes, the warrior is a formidable enemy. Euro-American
soldiers in general learn a highly stylized, ritualized form of warfare, with both written and customary rules. We are at
our best fighting organized soldieries who attempt a symmetrical response. But warriors respond asymmetrically,
leaving us in the role of redcoats marching into an Indian-dominated wilderness. Despite the valiant and skilled
performance of the US Army Rangers, our most significant combat encounter in Mogadishu looks just like Braddock's
defeat--and Russian regulars were recently "Little Big Horned" in Tajikistan by tribesmen who slipped across the
Afghan border.
While the US Army could rapidly devastate any band of warriors on a battlefield, few warlords will be foolish enough
to accept such a challenge. Warriors usually stand and fight only when they know or believe they have an
overwhelming advantage. Instead, they snipe, ambush, mislead, and betray, attempting to fool the constrained soldiers
confronting them into alienating the local population or allies, while otherwise simply hunkering down and trying to
outlast the organized military forces pitted against them. US soldiers are unprepared for the absolute mercilessness of
which modern warriors are capable, and are discouraged or forbidden by their civilian masters and their own customs
from taking the kind of measures that might be effective against members of the warrior class.
The US experience with warriors in Somalia has not been a happy one, but the disastrous UN experience in
Yugoslavia has been worse.[8] Imagining they can negotiate with governments to control warrior excesses, the United
Nations and other well-intentioned organizations plead with the men-in-suits in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo to
come to terms with one another. But the war in Bosnia and adjacent regions already has degenerated to a point where
many local commanders obey only orders which flatter them. Should a peace treaty ever come to signature, the only
way to make it work will be for those forces loyal to the central authorities to hunt down, disarm, and if necessary kill
their former comrades-in-arms who refuse to comply with the peace terms. Even then, "freedom fighters," bandits, and
terrorists will haunt the mountain passes and the urban alleys for years to come.
On the West Bank of the Jordan and in Gaza, the newly legitimized Palestinian authorities face formidable problems
with two lost generations, unskilled or de-skilled, whose heroes answer offers of dialog with terror and for whom
compromise appears equivalent to prostitution. Without the Intifada, many Palestinians, from teenagers to the
chronologically mature, have no core rationale for their lives. At a virtually immeasurable cultural remove, Irish
Republican Army terrorists are heroes only until the counties of Northern Ireland find peace. In Sri Lanka, many Tamil
rebels will never be able to return to productive lives in a settled society--nor will many of the Khmer Rouge,
Philippine communists, Angola's UNITA rebels, or any of Africa's other clan-based warriors masquerading behind the
rank and trappings of true soldiers.[9] Even in the United States, urban gang members exhibit warrior traits and may
be equally impossible to reconcile to civilized order as it is generally valued in Euro-America. For the warrior, peace
is the least-desirable state of affairs, and he is inclined to fight on in the absence of a direct, credible threat to his life.

As long as the warrior believes he can survive on the outside of any new peace, he will view a continuation of warfare
through criminal means as the most attractive alternative. And there is good reason for the warrior to decline to lay
down his arms--the most persistent and ruthless warriors ultimately receive the best terms from struggling
governments. Indeed, they sometimes manage to overthrow those governments and seize power when the governments
tumble into crisis after failing to deliver fundamental welfare and security to the population.[10]
In addition to those warriors whose educations--however rudimentary--were interrupted, men who fall into the warrior
class in adulthood often find their new situation far more pleasant than the manual labor for subsistence wages or
chronic unemployment to which peace had condemned them. The warrior milieu allows pathetic misfits to lead lives of
waking fantasy and remarkable liberties. Unlike organized militaries, paramilitary bands do not adhere to rigorous
training schedules, and when they need privies, they simply roust out the locals at gunpoint and tell them where to dig.
In the Yugoslav ruins, for instance, many of the patriotic volunteers (identical, whether Serb, Croat, or Bosnian
Muslim) find that war gives them leisure, choice, and recognition, as well as a camaraderie they never knew in the
past. The unemployed Lumpenproletarier from Mostar or Belgrade can suddenly identify with the action-video heroes
he and his comrades admire between raids on villages where only women, children, and old men remain.
In Armenia, during a period of crisis for Nagorno-Karabakh, I encountered a local volunteer who had dyed his
uniform black and who proudly wore a large homemade swastika on his breast pocket, even though his people had
suffered this century's first genocide.[11] The Russian mercenaries who rent out their resentment over failed lives
almost invariably seek to pattern themselves after Hollywood heroes, and even Somalia's warlords adorn themselves
with Anglo nicknames such as "Jess" or "Morgan."[12] This transfer of misunderstood totems between cultures has a
vastly more powerful negative effect on our world than the accepted logic of human behavior allows. But, then, we
have entered an age of passion and illogic, an era of the rejection of "scientific" order. That is exactly what the
pandemic of nationalism and fundamentalism is about. We are in an instinctive, intuitive phase of history, and such
times demand common symbols that lend identity and reduce the need for more intellectualized forms of
communication. Once, warriors wore runic marks or crosses on their tunics--today, they wear T-shirts with Madonna's
image (it is almost too obvious to observe that one madonna seems to be as good as another for humanity). If there are
two cultural artifacts in any given bunker in the Bosnian hills, they are likely to be a blond nude tear-out and a picture
of Sylvester Stallone as Rambo.[13] Many warriors, guilty of unspeakable crimes, develop such a histrionic self-image
that they will drop just about any task to pose for a journalist's camera--the photograph is a totem of immortality in the
warrior's belief system, which is why warriors will sometimes take the apparently illogical step of allowing snapshots
of their atrocities. In Renaissance Europe (and Europe may soon find itself in need of another renaissance), the typical
Landsknecht wanted money, loot, women, and drink. His modern counterpart also wants to be a star.[14]
Worldwide, the new warrior class already numbers in the millions.[15] If the current trend toward national dissolution
continues, by the end of the century there may be more of these warriors than soldiers in armies worthy of the name.
While exact figures will never be available, and statistics-junkies can quibble endlessly as to how many warriors are
really out there, the forest looks dark and ominous enough without counting each last tree. And perhaps the worst news
comes right out of Macbeth: the trees are moving.
Warrior-mercenaries always moved. Irishmen fought for France, Scots for Sweden, and the Germans sold their
unwashed swordarms to everyone from Palermo to Poland. But today's improved travel means allow warriors deprived
of "their" war to fly or drive to the next promising misfortune. Mujahedeen from Afghanistan, recently adored by
Americans, have turned up in Azerbaijan,[16] and Russian brawlers with military educations are fighting in Bosnia,
Croatia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, and as enforcers for the internationalizing Russian mafia. One of the
most intriguing characters I've met in the Caucasus was an ethnic-Armenian citizen of Lebanon who had been trained
by the PLO in the Bekaa Valley to fight Turkic Azeris in Karabagh. The Azeri warriors he faced have been trained by
entrepreneurial Russians, exasperated Turks, and reportedly by Iranians and Israelis.[17] In Bosnia, mustered out
Warsaw Pact soldiers serve in the same loosely organized units as adventure-seeking Germans and Frenchmen.[18] In
this regard, it might be in the interests of surrounding countries to let the fighting in Bosnia stew on: when that pot
cools there is going to be a lot of unattractive spillage. Yugoslavia and the wars on Russia's crumpled frontiers are vast
training grounds for the warriors who will not be content without a conflict somewhere. While most warriors will
attempt to maintain their privileges of violence on their own territory, within their own linguistic groups, the overall
number of warriors is growing so quickly that even a small percentage migrating from trouble spot to trouble spot

could present a destabilizing factor with which we have yet to reckon.

The US Army will fight warriors far more often than it fights soldiers in the future. This does not mean the Army
should not train to fight other organized militaries--they remain the most lethal, although not the most frequent, threat.
But it would be foolish not to recognize and study the nasty little men who will haunt the brutal little wars we will be
called upon to fight within the career spans of virtually every officer reading this text.[19]
There are quite a few realistic steps we might take to gain a better grasp on these inevitable, if unwanted, opponents.
First, we should begin to build an aggregate data base that is not rigidly compartmented by country and region. We
may deploy to the country where Warlord X has carved out his fief, or we may meet him or his warriors on the soil of
a third-party state.[20] The future may create allegiances and alliances which will confound us, but if we start now to
identify likely players, that drab, laborious, critical labor may pay significant dividends one day. As a minimum, if we
start files on warrior chieftains now, we will have richer background files on a number of eventual heads of state. Such
a data base will be a tough sell in a time of shrinking staffs and disappearing budgets, and analysts, accustomed to the
luxury of intellectual routine, will rebel against its challenge and uncertainty. But in practical terms, studying potential
opponents of this nature now will pay off on two counts: first, when we fight we will be more likely to know whom
we're fighting; second, the process of compiling such a data base will build human expertise in this largely neglected
field.[21]
We also need to struggle against our American tendency to focus on hardware and bean-counting to attack the more
difficult and subtle problems posed by human behavior and regional history. For instance, to begin to identify the
many fuses under the Caucasus powderkeg, you have to understand that Christian Armenians, Muslim (and other)
Kurds, and Arabs ally together because of their mutual legacy of hatred toward Turks. The Israelis support Turkic
peoples because Arabs support the Christians (and because the Israelis are drawn to Caspian oil). The Iranians see the
Armenians as allies against the Turks, but are torn because Azeri Turks are Shi'a Muslims.[22] And the Russians want
everybody out who doesn't "belong." Many of these alignments surprise US planners and leaders because we don't
study the hard stuff. If electronic collection means can't acquire it, we pretend we don't need it--until we find ourselves
in downtown Mogadishu with everybody shooting at us.
We need to commit more of our training time to warrior threats. But first we need to ask ourselves some difficult
questions. Do we have the strength of will, as a military and as a nation, to defeat an enemy who has nothing to lose?
When we face warriors, we will often face men who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally
according to our definition of rationality, who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of
language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive. We will face opponents for whom treachery is
routine, and they will not be impressed by tepid shows of force with restrictive rules of engagement. Are we able to
engage in and sustain the level of sheer violence it can take to eradicate this kind of threat? To date, the Somalia
experience says "No."
Although there are nearly infinite variations, this type of threat generally requires a two-track approach--an active
campaign to win over the populace coupled with irresistible violence directed against the warlord(s) and the warriors.
You cannot bargain or compromise with warriors. You cannot "teach them a lesson" (unless you believe that Saddam
Hussein or General Aideed have learned anything worthwhile from our fecklessness in the clinch). You either win or
you lose. This kind of warfare is a zero-sum game. And it takes guts to play.
Combatting warriors will force us to ask fundamental questions about ourselves as well as about our national and
individual identities and values. But the kind of warfare we are witnessing now and will see increasingly in the future
raises even more basic issues, challenging many of the assumptions in which liberal Western culture indulges.
Yugoslavia alone raises issues that have challenged philosophers and college freshmen since the first professor faced a
student. What is man's nature? Are we really the children of Rousseau and of Benetton ads, waiting only for evil
governments to collapse so that our peaceable, cotton-candy natures can reveal themselves? Or are we killing animals
self-organized into the disciplinary structures of civilization because the alternative is mutual, anarchic annihilation?
What of all that self-hobbling rhetoric about the moral equivalency of all cultures? Isn't it possible that a culture (or
religion or form of government) that provides a functional combination of individual and collective security with
personal liberties really does deserve to be taken more seriously than and emulated above a culture that glorifies

corruption, persecutes nonbelievers, lets gunmen rule, and enslaves its women? Is all human life truly sacred, no
matter what crimes the individual or his collective may commit?
Until we are able to answer such questions confidently, the members of the new warrior class will simply laugh at us
and keep on killing.
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courageous analysis of this metastasizing cultural crisis. Huntington was subsequently attacked in print by whole tribes
of pygmies, none of whom made a dent in his thesis. See also my article, "Vanity and the Bonfires of the 'isms,"
Parameters, 23 (Autumn 1993), 39-50.
2. For background on the Chechens, see Marie Bennigsen Broxup, ed., The North Caucasus Barrier (London: Hurst
and Company, 1992), or, for a fascinating historical perspective, Sh. V. Megrelidze, Zakavkaze v Russko-Turetskoy
Voine (Tbilisi: Metsniyereba, 1972). In fairness, it must be noted that the peoples of the North Caucasus generally
view Djokar Dudayev's Grosny government in a markedly positive light, crediting him as a patriot and capable
organizer, as was brought home to me by Dr. Zaur Dydymov, the energetic and talented Head of the Juridical
Department of the Daghestan Republic Council of Ministers.
3. As a draft of this article circulated, nothing excited so much comment as this phrase. In general, the otherwise
positive puritanism of the US officer corps and Foreign Service cripples our ability to understand some starkly
fundamental human motivations. We fear the hurricane of biology nearly as much as we distrust intuition, barricade
ourselves behind the quantifiable, and practice Jomini even as we quote poor translations of Clausewitz (US officers
have no sense of Clausewitz's Promethean Romanticism but sense that there's nonetheless some sort of uncomfortable
darkness about the guy). Confronted with "rape cultures," such as those of Slavic Orthodoxy or Sub-Saharan Africa,
we recoil to concentrate on the local traits that bear a reassuring resemblance to our own behavioral structures--not on
the crucial differences.
4. The government of Croatia chose the US Battle Dress Uniform for its military, not least for its evocative
associations. A visit to the provisional military museum in downtown Zagreb provides a wealth of stimulating images,
among them the World War II Croatian military's aping of Wehrmacht uniforms (Bundeswehr dress uniforms are still
in vogue), and the 1990s look for front line and COMMZ, the all-American BDU. The reasons for such choices and
tendential shifts are worth another article, at least.
5. For a classic study of how the bold, ruthless few drive the many, see Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, Volume One, Der
Aufsteig (Frankfurt/M: Verlag Ullstein, 1973). Also, the various writings of Sebastian Haffner on the rise and appeal of
National Socialism; Elias Canetti, Masse und Macht; any serious work on the 1917 Bolshevik coup. Sociopolitical
earthquakes, from the Reformation to the American Revolution, rarely have the active support of even one percent of
the population in their germinal phases. The majority of military coups in the non-competitive world also involve far
less than one percent of the population in their mechanisms. For nonpolitical, nonmilitary examples of the tyranny of
tiny, self-absorbed minorities over the mass, consider the impoundment of own cultural upper register by various
activist groups. Intriguingly, current research in the field of complexity offers a scientific demonstration of how the
activity of seemingly inconsequential variables can spark immeasurably disproportionate reactions.
6. Especially for US Army officers and diplomats, this century's great forgotten revolution and civil war--the Mexican
experience--merits study. An entry-level work is Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, The Great Rebellion, Mexico, 1905-1924
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1980). For a superb group portrait of "warriors," read Mariano Azuela's out-of-print
novel, The Underdogs, which provides remarkable insights into how Mexico's revolutionary warriors degenerated.
7. Ricarda Huch, Der Dreissigjaehrige Krieg (Frankfurt/M: Insel Verlag, 1912, 1914). Although Huch--the only major
German historian to defy Hitler--is stylistically out of fashion, this monumental work presents the richest picture ever
encountered by this author of how extended wars infected with a religious (read also "nationalist or ethnic") bias can
annihilate moral and social orders. No one who has read this work could fail to be haunted by its images. Also, Golo

Mann, Wallenstein (Frankfurt/M: S. Fischer Verlag GmbH, 1971), or, for English-only readers, the classic, and
classically restrained, study by C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (London: Johnathan Cape, 1938). A study of
the Thirty Years War is essential to understanding modern continental Europe, why Euro-Americans make war in such
a stylized fashion, and why we are so nonplussed by events in former Yugoslavia.
8. Personal conversations with UNPROFOR and UNHCR officers in Croatia, January-February 1994.
9. For a striking, highly readable, and provocative account, see Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The
Atlantic Monthly, February 1994. Kaplan is willing to take physical and intellectual risks most American journalists
shun. His book, Balkan Ghosts, offers a fine, quick introduction to a region we will still fail to understand after US
troops have been there for a decade or two.
10. This happened in 1993, in Azerbaijan, with the Huseinov coup, although the primary coupmaker has been
marginalized for now.
11. Many Armenian Fidayeen militiamen wear black uniforms with white Armenian crosses--a very different matter.
12. For the best reporting that came out of the US intervention in Somalia, see the series of articles by Sean Naylor,
then by Katherine McIntire, in Army Times, between January and March 1993. These two reporters avoided the
Mogadishu trap and went down-country to get the story the remainder of the media missed. Their work represents
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the attendant misery, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and Czechoslovakia after
1945 brought regional stability, as did the post-World War I expulsion of the Greeks from Anatolia. From the
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